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Abstract (max 170 words) 
Action monitoring allows the swift detection of conflicts, errors, and the rapid evaluation 
of outcomes. These processes are crucial for learning, adaptive behavior, and for the regulation 
of cognitive control. Our review discusses neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies that 
have explored the contribution of emotional and social factors during action monitoring. Meta-
analytic brain activation maps demonstrate reliable overlap of error monitoring, emotional, and 
social processes in the dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC), lateral prefrontal areas, and anterior 
insula (AI). Cumulating evidence suggests that action monitoring is modulated by trait anxiety 
and negative affect, and that activity of the dMFC and the amygdala during action monitoring 
might contribute to the ‘affective tagging’ of actions along a valence dimension. The role of AI 
in action monitoring may be the integration of outcome information with self-agency and social 
context factors, thereby generating more complex situation-specific and conscious emotional 
feeling states. Our review suggests that action-monitoring processes operate at multiple levels in 
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1 Overview and motivation   
In order to adapt their behavior, to detect and learn from errors, and ultimately to increase 
their chances of survival, humans and other animals have to monitor their actions (Rabbitt, 
1966). Flexible regulation of behavior requires its constant evaluation in terms of performance 
and outcomes, as well as in terms of costs and future consequences. Action and error monitoring 
have been studied for several decades in psychology and neuroscience (for previous reviews see 
e.g. Bush et al., 2000a; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010), 
mainly using relatively abstract interference paradigms (such as Stroop, Flanker, Simon or 
go/no-go tasks), and primarily from a cognitive perspective. The first part of this review provides 
a brief overview of the classical findings in this literature, outlining the main methods 
(electrophysiology and brain imaging), as well as the central brain systems involved in 
performance and error monitoring. In the main part, we review and discuss a growing literature 
that suggests close ties of action monitoring systems with emotional and social processes. In line 
with other recent accounts that suggest reciprocal interactions between cognitive control and 
emotion processing brain systems in dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC) (Etkin et al., 2011; 
Moser et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2008; Proudfit et al., 2013; Shackman et al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 
2013), we propose that error and action monitoring is an intrinsically affective and social 
process. However, we show that meta-analytic activation maps support overlapping brain 
responses to error processing, emotional, and social information processing not only in dMFC, 
but also in several other brain regions, including anterior insula and lateral prefrontal cortex. 
Further, recent intracranial electrophysiological recordings showed error-related activity in the 
amygdala, suggesting this limbic region may contribute to affective responses to errors and 
negative action outcomes. In the closing part, we outline an integrative framework for 
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understanding the brain systems underlying affective and social interactions with action 
monitoring, which may be crucial to foster behavioral control in real life. 
 
2 Behavioral and neurophysiological correlates of action monitoring 
2.1 Basic concepts and behavioral findings 
Action monitoring has mainly been studied by investigating behavioral and neural 
correlates of conflict, response error, and feedback processing in various reaction time tasks (for 
recent comprehensive reviews, see e.g. Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Shackman et al., 2011; 
Shenhav et al., 2013). In this context, conflict has been defined as crosstalk interference between 
different ongoing processes (Botvinick et al., 2001) and studied using interference or go/no-go 
tasks (for an overview on experimental paradigms see Nee et al., 2007; Shackman et al., 2011). 
Behaviorally, conflict is associated with longer reaction times and a greater number of errors 
than non-conflict trials (Botvinick et al., 1999; Gratton et al., 1992; Sheth et al., 2012). 
Errors are incorrect responses (in relation to the task instructions) and occur more 
frequently in incongruent (conflict) than in congruent trials (Carter, 1998; Gehring and Fencsik, 
2001; Gratton et al., 1992). They can be easily evoked as “false alarms” in no-go trials, 
especially when time pressure is high (e.g. Vocat et al., 2008) or when no-go trials are very 
infrequent (Simmonds et al., 2008). Errors are sometimes followed by post-error slowing, i.e. 
longer RTs on the (correct) trial following errors due to adjustments in response tendencies 
(Danielmeier et al., 2011; Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011; King et al., 2010) or as a reflection 
of attentional orienting to these deviant and worse than expected events (Notebaert et al., 2009; 
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Wessel et al., 2012). Errors can lead to increased post-error accuracy (Danielmeier and 
Ullsperger, 2011), indicating a potential shift in speed/accuracy trade-off. 
External feedback processing is studied with experimental tasks, in which participants are 
not able to infer the action outcome based on their response or based on an internal monitoring 
process exclusively (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002b; Miltner et al., 
1997), but have to rely on externally provided feedback. Examples include gambling tasks in 
which outcome is randomized or probabilistic in nature (Eppinger et al., 2008; Frank et al., 
2005), or time-estimation tasks (e.g. Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008; Miltner et al., 1997). Feedback 
about the action outcome (e.g. win or loss, correct or incorrect) is usually presented as visual or 
auditory information (Walsh and Anderson, 2012). 
2.2 Investing the time-course of action monitoring with electrophysiology 
For several reasons, electrophysiology provides an important methodological approach to 
the study of action monitoring brain processes. First, techniques such as EEG and intracranial 
electrophysiological recordings allow inferences about the time course of neurophysiological 
processes underlying error and conflict processing (Pourtois et al., 2010) with millisecond 
temporal resolution that is unattainable by brain imaging methods based on more sluggish 
hemodynamic contrasts (such as fMRI or PET). Second, event-related potentials (ERPs) have 
revealed several phasic components of conflict, error, and outcome monitoring, which have 
specific temporal and topographical properties, such as the N2, error-related negativity (ERN), 
and feedback-related negativity (FRN). These ERP components may partially reflect a common 
underlying process (Van Veen and Carter, 2002; Wessel et al., 2012; Yeung et al., 2004) that is 
characterized by phasic bursts in theta band activity (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Cohen, 2011). 
Beyond this common functional role, they can be considered as characteristic physiological 
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markers of conflict, error, and outcome processing (for overviews see Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
Simons, 2010). Given the combination of these properties, i.e. high time resolution and the 
specificity of action monitoring ERP components, electrophysiology can inform us about the 
temporal sequence of psychological processes during action monitoring, as well as the timing of 
their modulation by various affective, social, or cognitive factors.  
Depending on the task characteristics, electrophysiological indices of action monitoring 
can be observed at different stages, during stimulus processing and motor preparation, response 
execution, or outcome evaluation (see Figure 1). When response conflict and errors can be 
detected before or during the onset of the motor response, monitoring is based on internal motor 
and task representations, as reflected in the stimulus-locked conflict N2 component, as well as 
the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN or Ne) and error positivity (Pe). On the other 
hand, performance monitoring has to rely on external feedback when there is no reliable internal 
information about the outcome at the time of action execution (Bediou et al., 2012; Heldmann et 
al., 2008; Holroyd and Coles, 2002b; Koban et al., 2012b), leading to the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) that is locked to the presentation of visual feedback. The FRN is sometimes 
followed by a P300 to negative outcomes. These action monitoring ERP components (N2, ERN, 
Pe, and FRN) have been first described and studied for self-generated actions. Yet, an emerging 
literature suggests that similar components can be evoked for observed action outcomes, e.g. 
when watching the errors of another agent (see section 3.3 for an in-depth discussion). Figure 1 
summarizes the different stages of action monitoring and the corresponding electrophysiological 
components, for self-generated and observed actions.  
 
-- Please insert Figure 1 about here -- 
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2.3 Functional brain imaging results 
Functional brain imaging studies using fMRI and PET have shown that conflicts, as well 
as incorrect responses and negative performance feedback activate a widespread network of 
brain regions, comprising dACC/dMFC, anterior insula (AI) and frontal operculum, thalamus, 
and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) (Carter et al., 1998; Kiehl et al., 2000; Menon et al., 2001; 
Shackman et al., 2011; Ullsperger et al., 2010). In contrast, positive performance feedback or 
monetary gains are associated with increased activity of the ventral striatum (de Bruijn et al., 
2009; Delgado et al., 2000; Koban et al., 2013a; Thut et al., 1997).  
A great amount of theoretical and empirical work has addressed the roles of medial and 
lateral prefrontal areas (for recent reviews on empirial and theoretical aspects, see Shackman et 
al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 2013) and their relationship to behavioral adjustments (King et al., 
2010; Sheth et al., 2012). For example, an fMRI study by Kerns et al (2004; see also MacDonald 
et al., 2000) demonstrated that the dACC/dMFC responds to errors more than to correct 
responses, but also to correct conflict trials more than to incorrect conflict trials (but see 
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001). Importantly, these conflict-related signal changes in dMFC 
predicted both dlPFC activation and behavioral adjustments in subsequent trials (in terms of 
faster reaction times, Gratton et al., 1992), in line with theoretical accounts suggesting that 
conflict detection in dMFC triggers adaptive changes in cognitive control, which are 
implemented by LPFC (Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2004). 
Together with ERP results, brain imaging studies thus confirm the involvement of 
dACC/dMFC in conflict and action monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). However, it remains 
an open question whether errors, conflicts, and outcomes elicit common activations on a smaller 
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spatial scale and whether they are related to differential connectivity patterns with other brain 
regions. For instance, recent research has demonstrated dissociable brain activations for these 
different events, with errors activating more anterior and ventral subregions, and conflicts more 
dorsal parts of the dMFC (e.g. Desmet et al., 2011; Garavan et al., 2003; Nee et al., 2011; 
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001). 
Whereas the roles of dMFC and LPFC in action monitoring and regulatory processes 
have been intensively researched and debated (for reviews and theoretical frameworks see 
Alexander and Brown, 2011; Botvinick, 2007; Rushworth et al., 2007; Shackman et al., 2011; 
Shenhav et al., 2013), the functions of other regions commonly activated by conflicts and errors 
are less clear. The anterior insula (AI), together with frontal operculum and inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG), is one of the most consistently activated regions in response to errors, negative feedback, 
and conflict (for a recent review, see Chang et al., 2013; Koban et al., 2013a; Koban et al., 
2013b; Nee et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010), but its role remains unspecified in most models 
of action and conflict monitoring (for exceptions see Brass and Haggard 2010; Ullsperger et al., 
2010). Using an anti-saccade task, Klein et al. (2007) showed that the left AI is more activated 
for aware than unaware errors. This led to the hypothesis that AI is important for the conscious 
detection of errors (Klein et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010), in line with studies highlighting 
the role of this region in interoception and bodily awareness (Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004). 
Given the involvement of AI in emotions and the representation of bodily states of self and 
others (Craig, 2009; Kober et al., 2008; Lamm et al., 2011; Singer et al., 2009), it may be 
implicated in the affective component of error and outcome processing (Brass and Haggard, 
2010), as outlined in the next sections. 
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3 Emotional and social effects on action monitoring 
In the next sections, we provide evidence for important affective and social influences on 
action and performance monitoring. Using term-based meta-analytic images, we first explore 
anatomical convergence between brain areas involved in action monitoring as well as in affective 
and social processes, and briefly discuss their role in those different domains. Then, we present 
recent empirical findings that suggest a close relationship between performance monitoring and 
affective processes. We argue that actions are automatically appraised along an affective valence 
dimension in the ACC and amygdala concurrently, whereas the AI may integrate action 
outcomes with agency and social context, thereby potentially eliciting more complex and 
situation-specific emotions such as shame or guilt. 
3. 1 Anatomical convergence between error monitoring, emotional, and social 
processing 
Several of the regions involved in action monitoring have also been associated with 
affective and social processes (for previous meta-analysis for social and affective processes see 
Bzdok et al., 2013; Kober et al., 2008; Lamm et al., 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012; Overwalle, 
2009; Wagner et al., 2012a). To characterize the overlap between brain regions consistently 
activated for error monitoring as well as for emotion and social cognition tasks, we employed 
term-based meta-analytic images of the NeuroSynth database (Yarkoni et al., 2011a; Yarkoni et 
al., 2011b). NeuroSynth is an ambitious project aimed at automatic identification, extraction, and 
synthesis of human functional brain imaging results and corresponding meta-data (Yarkoni et al., 
2011a). It uses text-mining techniques to detect frequently used terms (as proxies for concepts of 
interest) in the neuroimaging literature: terms that occur at a high frequency in a given study are 
then associated with activation coordinates in this publication, allowing for automated generation 
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of meta-analytic activation maps based on a very large number of studies (currently 5809 
published papers, as of August 2013). Despite the automaticity and the potential noise resulting 
from the association between term frequency and coordinate tables, this approach has been 
shown to be very robust and reliable for broad constructs (Yarkoni et al., 2011a). 
Using the NeuroSynth web interface (www.neurosynth.org), we extracted forward 
inference brain images for the terms ‘Errors’, ‘Emotion’, and ‘Social’ (downloaded on July 18, 
2013, see supplementary materials for a listing of included studies). These images were overlaid 
on a standard anatomical template and shown at a FDR-corrected threshold of p < 0.05 (see 
Figure 2A for ‘Errors’ and ‘Emotion’, Figure 2B for ‘Errors’ and ‘Social’). In line with the 
literature reviewed above, ‘Error’-related activity was found in dMFC (including cingulate and 
medial frontal gyri), LPFC (middle and inferior frontal gyri), AI, nucleus caudatus, and parietal 
cortex (inferior and superior parietal lobule). ‘Emotion’ activated bilateral amygdala, AI, dMFC 
(medial and superior frontal gyri), inferior frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, and inferior temporal 
gyrus. Widespread brain activations were further found for ‘Social’, including medial prefrontal 
cortex (subgenual cingulate, medial frontal gyrus), dMFC, LPFC (inferior frontal and middle 
frontal gyri), AI, amygdala, thalamus, inferior and superior parietal lobule, precuneus, fusiform 
and inferior occipital gyri, as well as middle and superior temporal gyri. 
  For the conjunction analysis, we used a conservative minimum statistics approach 
(Nichols et al., 2005). Very similar results were found for the conjunction [‘Errors’ AND 
‘Emotion’], as well as for [‘Errors’ AND ‘Social’] (see clusters depicted in yellow, Figure 2), 
indicating overlapping activations in dMFC, AI, LPFC, and basal ganglia for all of these three 
domains. These brain areas may therefore be involved in the integrative processing of action 
monitoring with affective and social factors. 
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-- please insert Figure 2 about here -- 
 
Anterior cingulate cortex has been traditionally viewed as an important hub for emotional 
processing (Papez, 1937; Tow and Whitty, 1953), and considerable debate has evolved around 
the question of how emotional and cognitive information processing are organized and integrated 
in cingulate cortex (Drevets and Raichle, 1998). Earlier accounts have proposed separate 
emotional and cognitive subdivisions of ACC (Bush et al., 2000b; Devinsky et al., 1995), with 
the more anterior part being assigned a role in affective processing and the dorsal section in 
cognitive processing. However, this view has been challenged by accumulating evidence 
indicating that dorsal ACC, or more broadly dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC), is involved in 
both cognitive and emotional processing (see meta-analyses by Etkin et al., 2011; Shackman et 
al., 2011), and could therefore constitute an important hub for emotion-cognition interactions 
(Pessoa, 2008). The functional model by Etkin et al puts forward that the dMFC is involved in 
affective appraisal and the expression of emotions, whereas more ventral parts of ACC and 
medial prefrontal cortex are important for their regulation. Similarly, Shackman et al. (2011) 
posit a central role of dMFC in negative emotion, pain, and cognitive control processes. The 
“adaptive control hypothesis” (Shackman et al., 2011) suggests that the anterior midcingulate 
cortex / dMFC is engaged when there is uncertainty about actions and their potentially aversive 
outcomes, and that this mediofrontal region integrates events such as errors, pain, or conflict, 
which require adjustments in adaptive control (see also Botvinick et al., 2001; Seeley et al., 
2007). 
However, our meta-analytic conjunction analysis indicates that dMFC might not be the 
only candidate for cognitive-affective integration during action monitoring (see also Pessoa, 
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2008). Other regions, especially AI and lateral prefrontal cortex are activated by emotional, 
social, and error monitoring processes as well, and might therefore also constitute important hubs 
between different systems (Pessoa, 2008; Sridharan et al., 2008) and for convergence between 
action monitoring and socio-affective information (Brass and Haggard, 2010; Koban et al., 
2013a; Ullsperger et al., 2010). In the following sections, we describe behavioral and 
neurophysiological evidence for affective and social influences on action monitoring, and 
interactions of these processes in dMFC and AI. 
3.1 Interactions between affective processes and error monitoring 
Conflicts or response errors have often been seen in the literature as distinctive or special 
events (in the sense of being unexpected, surprising and deviant, sometimes even considered to 
be “noisy”). They inform therefore about the regulation of behavioral control – i.e. how specific 
brain processes are engaged following these adverse outcomes in order to enhance cognitive 
control (through putative top-down attention control mechanisms), and eventually restore the 
normal mode of processing, or homeostasis (Weissman et al., 2006; Wessel et al., 2012).  
Although these processes have mainly been studied from a cognitive framework, growing 
evidence suggests that they are not immune to emotions, but interact with motivational and 
affective factors. Psychophysiological and behavioral studies showed that response errors (and 
conflicts) activate a defensive motivational system (recently reviewed by Dreisbach and Fischer, 
2012; Proudfit et al., 2013). For example, response errors during a flanker task yield larger skin 
conductance responses and greater heart rate deceleration than correct decisions (Hajcak et al., 
2003b), as well as a larger potentiation of the startle reflex (Foti and Hajcak, 2009). These 
findings suggest that response errors may be perceived as aversive and distressing events (Spunt 
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et al., 2012), which are associated with enhanced arousal and increased activation of the 
autonomic nervous system (Hajcak et al., 2003b).  
3.1.1 Involvement of the amygdala in action monitoring 
Direct hints regarding the involvement of emotion-related brain areas were obtained 
recently by means of intracranial recordings in humans (Pourtois et al., 2010). In this 
neurophysiological study, two pharmacoresistant patients, implanted invasively with intracranial 
depth electrodes in the dorsal ACC and amygdala prior to surgery for refractory epilepsy, 
performed a go/no-go task (Aarts and Pourtois, 2010; Koban et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 2008). 
Results showed that response errors in this task were associated with a distinctive increase of 
phasic theta bursts in the dorsal ACC rapidly following the onset of these adverse events, 
consistent with scalp ERP results and the generation of the ERN component (see Cavanagh et al., 
2012). Further, intracranial local field potentials (iLFPs) recorded in the amygdala revealed that 
this mesio-temporal lobe structure showed increased electrophysiological activity following 
errors compared to correct actions (Pourtois et al., 2010). Moreover, a selective coupling in the 
theta band between dorsal ACC iLFPs and amygdala iLFPs suggested a dynamic cross-talk 
between these two brain regions during error detection, and action monitoring more broadly. The 
involvement of the amygdala in action and error monitoring has been confirmed by functional 
brain imaging (Pourtois et al., 2010), including in healthy adult participants (Polli et al., 2008; 
Polli et al., 2009; Sagaspe et al., 2011).  
Although compelling, the evidence for autonomic responses and for the involvement of 
the amygdala (or other emotion control brain systems besides or beyond the dorsal ACC) in 
action monitoring and error detection remains largely correlational in nature, and not all imaging 
studies have reported amygdala activation to response errors or negative feedback (see meta-
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analysis, Figure 2). Recent neurophysiological evidence suggests however that the amygdala, 
and more specifically the basolateral nucleus, may play an important role in error but not conflict 
monitoring (Kashtelyan et al., 2012). These findings suggest that the amygdala might be 
implicated in error monitoring mostly when errors imply learning. More generally, they are 
compatible with earlier neurophysiological findings showing that the amygdala, together with 
other sub cortical structures, might be involved in “prediction error" or "surprise", i.e. detection 
of discrepancy between expected and obtained outcome (see Holland and Gallagher, 2006).  
3.1.2 Evidence from affective priming studies 
Enhanced amygdala and autonomic nervous system activity accompanying response 
errors does not inform about whether valence-specific effects can be obtained as a function of the 
perceived goal conduciveness (Scherer, 1984, 1988) of simple self-generated actions. In this 
alternative framework, specific appraisal monitoring processes are assumed to be involved in the 
processing of the valence (opposed to arousal value) of simple actions, such as to mark incorrect 
actions as bad/negative and correct ones as good/positive (Aarts et al., 2012). In essence, this 
online evaluative process would promote adaptive behavior not only by increasing arousal and 
defense systems in response to errors, but by “tagging” motivational or affective meaning to each 
and every action.  
Recently, some advancement has been made at the methodological level in order to 
corroborate the assumption that the monitoring of simple actions made during standard 
interference tasks is not devoid of emotion. Aarts and colleagues (2012) sought to test whether 
actions made during a simple go/no-go task might be processed rapidly along a genuine affective 
valence dimension. Their hypothesis was that incorrect actions (errors) should be associated with 
negative affective valence (“bad”), while conversely correct actions should be tagged as positive 
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(“good”). For this purpose, Aarts et al. made use of the evaluative priming paradigm (Fazio et 
al., 1986), in which each action made during the primary go/no-go task served as a prime for a 
secondary word discrimination task, unbeknown to the participants. This secondary task required 
participants to discriminate the valence (positive versus negative) of an emotional word that was 
presented for a few milliseconds on the screen directly following every response made in the 
primary task. Aarts et al. reasoned that if specific emotion systems are engaged rapidly during 
action monitoring, then a significant priming effect between the action (prime) and the written 
word (target) might arise. More specifically, they conjectured that errors made during the 
primary task would automatically prime negative affect and therefore speed up the detection of 
subsequent negative compared to positive words. Conversely, correct responses in the primary 
task may prime positive affect and lead to faster discrimination of positive than negative words. 
The results of this study confirmed their predictions (Aarts et al., 2012). As such, these findings 
go beyond earlier results that showed that response errors enhance autonomic arousal and 
activate a defensive motivational system (Hajcak and Foti, 2008). Additionally, they demonstrate 
that simple actions are constantly monitored in terms of their valence. This means not only 
marking response errors as bad, but also identifying correct actions as good events. This dynamic 
process, directly linking actions and outcomes to positive and negative affective states (see also 
Brass and Haggard, 2010; Craig, 2009; Ullsperger et al., 2010) appears especially important to 
promote learning and to enable adaptive behavior in an ever-changing and complex environment.  
Interestingly, these priming results were observed when the time interval between the 
action and the word was set to 300 or 600 ms, but not for intervals of 1000 ms, suggesting that 
the association of actions with affective valence is rapid and automatic. This timing is in line 
with the early amygdala responses to errors and correct actions evidenced in intracranial 
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recordings, as reviewed here above (Pourtois et al., 2010). Given the important role of the 
amygdala in the detection of emotionally salient external stimuli (Anderson and Phelps, 2000; 
LaBar et al., 1998; Phelps, 2006; Sander et al., 2003; Vuilleumier, 2005; Whalen et al., 2001), 
this structure could be similarly involved in the rapid affective monitoring of internally generated 
action events (Barbas et al., 2011). Similar behavioral priming effects have been observed for 
incongruent compared to congruent trials in the flanker task (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012), 
suggesting that not only errors, but also conflict and the need for increased cognitive control are  
automatically perceived as aversive and associated with negative valence (Botvinick, 2007; 
Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012). Interestingly, behavioral results also suggest that although 
conflicts and interference may be perceived as aversive, they can acquire positive valence, if 
participants are able to resolve conflict, i.e. to overcome task interference (Schouppe et al., in 
revision). Hence, conflicts may be perceived as negative or as positive depending on their 
processing stage and on the potential for resolution (i.e., coping potential), suggesting that 
interaction effects between action monitoring and affective processes are flexible and dynamic 
(Gentsch et al., 2013).    
Aarts and colleagues (2013) extended their earlier findings by using ERPs to investigate 
the electrophysiological time-course of this affective priming by simple actions. They found that 
the amplitude difference between the ERN for errors minus the CRN for correct responses in the 
go/no-go task was correlated with the magnitude of the evaluative priming effect in the 
secondary word discrimination task. This suggests that the ERN-CRN amplitude difference 
might actually reflect the differential affective values of incorrect versus correct actions, in line 
with evidence that the ERN is correlated to the significance of errors (see also Luu et al., 2000; 
Olvet and Hajcak, 2008; Simons, 2010). Another distinctive property of these priming effects 
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was that high levels of negative affect and trait anxiety/apprehension were associated with 
weaker affective priming effects elicited by errors versus correct responses (Aarts et al., 2012). 
This indicates that personality traits and individual differences in negative affect and 
internalizing disorders may modulate key processes during action monitoring, as it will be 
discussed in the next section.  
3.1.3 Evidence from individual differences and psychopathology 
One of the most robust findings in the error monitoring literature is an enhanced ERN/Ne 
component in participants with high trait negative affect (see Moser et al., 2013; Olvet and 
Hajcak, 2008; Simons, 2010; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012). Using standard interference tasks, 
several ERP studies have reported greater ERN/Ne (and often CRN) components in patients with 
anxiety or internalizing disorders (Krueger et al., 2001), including obsessive compulsive 
disorders (Carrasco et al., 2006; Endrass et al., 2008; Endrass et al., 2010; Gehring et al., 2000; 
Hajcak and Simons, 2002; Johannes et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010), depression (Aarts et al., in 
press), and generalized anxiety disorders (Weinberg et al., 2010). Likewise, even healthy 
participants with higher levels of subclinical trait anxiety were shown to have increased ERN and 
CRN components (Aarts and Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2003a; Moser et al., 2013). Further, 
the amplitude of these components has been related to sensitivity to punishment, a trait that 
strongly correlates with anxiety, harm avoidance, neuroticism, and negative affect (Boksem et 
al., 2006). 
Interestingly, in all these previous action-monitoring studies, the effects of negative affect 
were selective for the ERN component, while leaving the subsequent Pe component unaffected. 
The component-specific modulation of action monitoring by negative affect is compatible with 
evidence that the ERN and Pe components are likely generated by different brain systems and 
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functionally dissociable (Dhar et al., 2011; Koban et al., 2012a; Overbeek et al., 2005b; 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2009; Wessel, 2012). This suggests that modulatory effects exerted by 
dispositional negative affect and anxiety disorders may selectively enhance very early action 
monitoring and error detection brain processes, whereas later—potentially regulatory—processes 
may be preserved (but see Aarts et al., in press, for an amplitude modulation of the Pe 
component in major depression).  
Based on this evidence, some authors have put forward the proposal that the ERN could 
be considered as a reliable endophenotype or biomarker for internalizing disorders (Olvet and 
Hajcak, 2008; Proudfit et al., 2013). Yet, it remains currently unclear why internalizing disorders 
would be associated with overactive early error monitoring processes at the level of the ERN-
CRN component exclusively. Interestingly, the observation of an overactive ERN is not 
paralleled by any behavioral deficits or other changes in task performance in patients compared 
to controls. In other words, high-anxious individuals usually respond as fast and as accurately as 
low-anxious individuals, yet their electrophysiological response to errors is increased compared 
to low-anxious participants (see meta-analysis by Moser et al., 2013). Further, this enhanced 
electrophysiological response is not only observed for the ERN, but in some studies also for the 
CRN, i.e. in the electrophysiological response to correct responses (Aarts and Pourtois, 2010). 
Although this CRN effect is not found consistently across all studies and therefore might be 
specific for speeded go/no-go paradigms, this point casts doubts on the interpretation that 
negative affect influences the processing of response errors selectively. Instead, a more 
parsimonious account posits that high anxiety (apprehension, as opposed to anxious arousal) and 
more generally internalizing disorders may be associated with increased dMFC responses to both 
incorrect and correct but risky actions.  
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While mounting evidence suggests altered action monitoring at the level of the response, 
the literature exploring potential effects of anxiety and negative affect on the monitoring of 
external performance feedback and the FRN is rather scarce. One study (De Pascalis et al., 2010) 
found that individuals who were more sensitive to punishment (as evidenced using the BIS-BAS 
scale, see Carver and White, 1994) had a larger FRN to monetary losses in a go/no-go task. By 
contrast, two other ERP studies reported reduced FRN amplitudes for high, compared to low 
anxious individuals (Gu et al., 2010; Simons, 2010). Similarly, Aarts & Pourtois (2012) found 
that sub-clinical high trait anxiety was associated with blunted FRN components to evaluative 
feedback. By contrast, depression does not seem to reduce the FRN component (Mies et al., 
2011). Together, these findings suggest that modulatory effects of negative affect on action 
monitoring may not be restricted to internally driven (i.e., response-related) monitoring 
processes, but extend to externally driven (i.e., feedback related) processes, but with potentially 
opposite effects. To the best of our knowledge, no ERP study to date has reported an enhanced 
FRN component in anxiety or negative affect. This observation challenges the assumption that 
this ERP component reflects the counterpart of the ERN when action monitoring is primarily 
achieved based on external evaluative feedback (as opposed to internal motor or cognitive effects 
for the ERN, see Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Heldmann et al., 2008; Holroyd and Coles, 
2002a; Miltner et al., 1997) and that both components can be related to a common theta band 
oscillatory process (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Cohen, 2011).  
 
3.2 Social effects on action monitoring 
Beyond the evidence of emotion effects on action monitoring, a rapidly growing 
literature suggests important social influences on error and outcome processing. In general, these 
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studies can be organized into two main questions: The first is how people monitor others’ actions 
and learn from observation. The second main research question is how social context modulates 
the monitoring of our own actions. The answers to these questions will inform us on the brain 
mechanisms underlying action monitoring in interpersonal and group settings, as well as how 
human behavior may be adjusted to the requirements of social life in more general ways.  
3.2.1 Monitoring and evaluating the actions of others 
In line with the general idea of motor simulation and mirror neuron systems (Gallese et 
al., 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006), monitoring of others’ errors and action outcomes might 
be based on similar mechanisms than the processing of self-generated actions, and involve the 
motor cortex and interconnected cingulate areas (Fadiga et al., 2005; van Schie et al., 2004). 
When watching a confederate or another participant performing an interference or go/no-go task, 
observation of their response errors leads to a specific ERP component, the observer ERN 
(oERN, see also Figure 1). The oERN resembles the ERN in its frontocentral topography and 
sources in the dMFC (Miltner et al., 2004; van Schie et al., 2004). Interestingly, the timing of the 
oERN seems to depend on the type of experimental task, as well as on the social relationship 
between observer and agent. Whereas the oERN in flanker tasks peaks around 250-300ms after 
observed motor errors (de Bruijn and von Rhein, 2012; Miltner et al., 2004; van Schie et al., 
2004), it has been found much earlier (~30ms and ~140ms) in go/no-go task (Bates et al., 2005), 
but only when the relationship between participants was cooperative, as opposed to competitive 
(Koban et al., 2010). This has led to the suggestion that cooperation might enable the monitoring 
of observed actions based on shared simulated motor and task/goal representations (Sebanz et al., 
2006a; Sebanz et al., 2006b), whereas participants may rely on purely visual and conceptual 
information during competition (Koban et al., 2010). In flanker tasks, vicarious errors might be 
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harder to monitor, as they require detecting a mismatch between required response and actual 
response (e.g. left versus right key press), compared to go/no-go tasks where they could be 
detected much more easily (any response in a no-go trial is an error). Our observation that the 
amplitude of the early oERN was highly correlated with an observer N2 component (Koban et 
al., unpublished data) corroborates this interpretation.  
The oERN is followed by a frontocentral positivity, the observer Pe (oPe, Carp et al., 
2009) around 300-600ms after another person’s error. Likewise, when visual performance 
feedback is presented following others’ actions or gambling decisions, an observer FRN (oFRN) 
effect can be seen, with a very similar latency (around 200-350ms) and topographical pattern 
(although slightly smaller in amplitude) to the player FRN (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Leng 
and Zhou, 2010; Yu and Zhou, 2006). Given their topographical and temporal similarities, the 
oERN, which is locked to another person’s motor response, and the feedback-locked oFRN 
might potentially reflect the same or a very similar monitoring process.  
In line with these electrophysiological results, fMRI studies have shown increased BOLD 
activity in dMFC for observed errors compared to observed correct trials (de Bruijn et al., 2009; 
Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Shane et al., 2008), as well as in other regions such as AI, IFG, 
together with parietal and occipital areas (Koban et al., 2013a; Shane et al., 2008), indicating that 
activations for vicarious and self-generated errors may only partially overlap (Koban et al., 
2013a; Shane et al., 2008).  
The findings of parallel brain responses to self-generated and observed action errors have 
recently been confirmed using single-cell recordings in macaque mediofrontal cortex (Yoshida et 
al., 2012). This study showed enhanced firing in a large number of MFC neurons during 
observed errors compared to observed correct actions of another monkey, as well as during 
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reward delivery to the other monkey (Yoshida et al., 2012). Interestingly however, most of these 
neurons did not respond to self-generated errors, indicating parallel but separate neural 
populations for the monitoring of self- and other-generated actions (Yoshida et al., 2012). 
Error and feedback observation is modulated by several relationship factors between 
observer and agent. de Bruijn et al. (2009) investigated brain responses to observed performance 
feedback in cooperation vs. competition (see also Koban et al., 2012). These authors 
demonstrated activation of dMFC for errors compared to hits independent of context, whereas 
the ventral striatum responded as a function of the subjective reward value of errors vs. hits 
(higher striatum activation for hits in cooperation, and for errors in competition). Similarly, it has 
been shown that other persons’ positive outcomes activate the ventral striatum more when they 
are perceived as more similar to the self (Mobbs et al., 2009), in line with the assumption that 
affective responses to observed outcomes depend on the relationship between self and other (see 
also Carp et al., 2009; Itagaki, 2008; Kang and Hirsh, 2010; Koban et al., 2010; Marco-Pallares 
et al., 2010). Additionally, individual differences in personality may influence the processing of 
observed actions and errors, especially perspective taking and empathy (Koban et al., 2012b; Rak 
et al., 2013; Thoma and Bellebaum, 2012). This is consistent with evidence from studies on error 
monitoring in conditions such as psychopathy or antisocial personality disorder, which are 
characterized by abnormally low empathy. Individuals with psychopathy have been 
demonstrated to show normal ERP responses to self-generated, but reduced ERP amplitudes to 
observed errors and correct responses (Brazil et al., 2011). Thus, as much as one’s own, self-
generated actions are evaluated on an affective dimension, being able to understand the emotions 
of others might be an important prerequisite for monitoring and understanding observed actions. 
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3.2.2 Social influences on the monitoring of self-generated actions 
Evidence of interaction effects between the monitoring of self- with other-generated 
actions comes from behavioral studies investigating post-error adaptation effects in social 
context. Several experiments have shown that post-error slowing does not only occur following 
one’s own errors, but also when observing another person inadvertently committing an incorrect 
response (de Bruijn et al., 2011; Núñez Castellar et al., 2011; Schuch and Tipper, 2007). 
Interestingly, this effect has been found to be greater in cooperative compared to competitive 
interpersonal settings (de Bruijn et al., 2011; Núñez Castellar et al., 2011), which could be 
explained either by larger shared (motor) representation in the cooperative context, or 
alternatively by differential affective valence of observed errors in the two settings (Núñez 
Castellar et al., 2011).  
Surprisingly, only recently ERP or fMRI studies have been conducted to investigate how 
brain responses to one’s own action outcomes are modulated by social factors. For instance, a 
recent study (Van Meel and Van Heijningen, 2010) found an FRN for negative as compared to 
positive feedback during a learning task only when participants performed the task in a 
competitive setting, but not in an individual control condition. This result could indicate that the 
mere presence of other persons may enhance the processing of feedback, potentially as an effect 
of social comparison (Boksem et al., 2011a). Further, the emotional appraisal of others may 
affect performance monitoring: for instance, when presenting facial expressions of disgust as 
task cues, one study found increased ERN amplitudes compared to other facial expressions 
(Boksem et al., 2011b).  
Indeed, actions in real life can have important consequences for other people, and it is 
thus not surprising that the social relationship between agent and observer, as well as other 
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context factors can have profound influences on their monitoring and appraisal. FMRI results 
indicate that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex shows higher activation during error monitoring 
in social relative to individual settings (Radke et al., 2011). In a recent ERP study, Koban et al. 
(2012) showed that the FRN was increased in cooperative compared to competitive context, with 
underlying sources in the dorsomedial PFC, LPFC, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ), all these 
regions being typically involved in social cognition (see Figure 2, and cf. Kelley et al., 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 2005; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). This increase in FRN amplitude was followed by 
a feedback-P300 effect that was specific for self-generated action outcomes in cooperative 
context. Moreover, the P300 was generated by sources in dMFC and AI and correlated with 
individual differences in trait empathy. Given the increased social relevance of negative 
performance when playing as a team, this effect could therefore reflect an increased affective 
response to negative feedback in cooperative context (Koban et al., 2012b).  
To test more directly how humans integrate information about the potentially detrimental 
consequences of their actions for others, Koban et al. (2013) recently developed a new fMRI 
task, in which half of the error trials would lead to painful heat stimulation to a friend outside the 
scanner. Behaviorally, errors that caused pain to the friend were associated with increased 
feelings of guilt, shame, and higher ratings of empathic pain. These effects were paralleled by 
increased activations in dMFC, AI and dlPFC. Importantly, left AI and dlPFC showed 
interactions between action agency and empathic pain, indicating that these regions may 
integrate the processing of self-generated errors with the social consequences of actions (Koban 
et al., 2013a). This integration process should be crucial for the generation of moral emotions 
such as guilt and shame that are associated with self-generated actions that have socially negative 
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consequences (Chang et al., 2011; Koban et al., 2013a; Wagner et al., 2012b; Wagner et al., 
2011; Yu et al., 2013). 
How outcomes of our decisions are evaluated also depends on what results alternative 
counterfactual actions would have had. For instance, if we pick one of two alternative bets and 
we lose, we may experience the feeling of regret, especially when we see that the other option 
would have been a winning one (Coricelli et al., 2005). The impact of such counterfactual 
choices is even more pronounced in social settings, indicating that these may provide additional 
information for learning (Coricelli and Rustichini, 2010). One ERP study indicates that the FRN 
to one’s own outcomes might be modulated as a function of whether a co-player wins or loses at 
the same time (Qiu et al., 2010). In an fMRI study on social comparison, dACC activation was 
related to envying others’ success, whereas schadenfreude was associated with ventral striatum 
activity when gloating over the misfortune of a previously envied person (Takahashi et al., 
2009). Other investigations (Bault et al., 2008; Bault et al., 2011) used a lottery choice task that 
enabled the comparison of actual outcome to the (counterfactual) outcome of the non-chosen 
lottery. In half of the trials, the participants could additionally observe the outcome of choices 
made by another player. These authors found greater emotional responses to outcomes and 
counterfactual choices in the social different-outcomes condition, i.e. when the gains did not only 
lead to relief, but to gloating, and losses were not only associated with regret, but with envy 
(Bault et al., 2008; Bault et al., 2011). These behavioral findings were paralleled by higher 
BOLD activation of medial prefrontal cortex, striatum, TPJ, and DLPFC for gains in social 
context that were paired with losses for the other player, indicating a highly competitive 
component of outcome evaluation (Bault et al., 2011).  
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Together with other previous behavioral and brain imaging studies, these results highlight 
the importance of social factors in action outcome evaluation and for behavioral adjustments, as 
well as the interplay between brain regions involved in social cognition on the one hand and 
reward and error processing mechanisms on the other hand. Further, studying the effects of 
social context on action monitoring may not only help understanding the interplay of the 
different functional networks in adaptive behavioral control, but also allow eliciting and studying 
complex emotions such as regret, envy, guilt, pride, and gloating in experimentally well-
controlled settings (Chang and Koban, 2013). Ultimately, it may also contribute to a better 
understanding of psychiatric conditions such as psychopathy, autism, or alexithymia, which may 
be shaped by impaired processing of social-affective aspects of action monitoring in different 
prefrontal and limbic regions.   
 
4 Towards an integrative framework of action monitoring 
Taken together, our review of the literature suggests that action monitoring is strongly 
influenced by a number of affective and social factors. This is in line with the idea that adaptive 
control of behavior in real life requires the constant integration of various processing streams and 
sources of information. 
Demonstrating integration of several processes requires showing that a given region 
responds to all of those processes, and that this region shows interaction effects between them 
(Gray et al., 2002; Gu et al., 2012). Using term-based meta-analytic images, we found evidence 
for the first premise and demonstrated extensive overlap between action monitoring, emotion 
processes, and social cognition in dACC/dMFC and bilateral AI, plus lateral prefrontal areas. 
Previous anatomical and connectivity studies have shown that dMFC and AI are highly 
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interconnected and constitute a cingulo-opercular functional network (Modha and Singh, 2010), 
which has been suggested to play an important role in the detection of salient events and the need 
for changes in cognitive control (Nee et al., 2007; Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan et al., 2008). In 
parallel, hyperactivity of the cingulo-opercular network has been linked to anxiety and anxiety 
disorders (Etkin, 2010; Etkin and Wager, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; Sylvester et al., 2012).  
In line with the idea of integrative processing of affective factors and action monitoring, 
EEG studies have revealed important influences of negative affect and anxiety on early action 
monitoring components. Most of these empirical results suggest highly correlated activity in the 
dMFC and AI during action monitoring, as well as during other tasks and processes (Craig, 
2009; Ullsperger et al., 2010). Yet, most theoretical accounts have focused on either one of these 
two regions (and ignored the other) or treated both as an entity (e.g. as a cingulo-opercular 
network). Few attempts have been made to dissociate and contrast the contributions of dMFC 
and AI in error and action monitoring specifically, and in other domains more generally (but see 
Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004; Ullsperger et al., 2010). In what follows, we propose that 
effects of emotional and social factors may be slightly different in these two regions and 
potentially reflect dissociable processes. The main assumption of this framework is that, within 
this cingulo-opercular functional network, emotional and social influences on action monitoring 
likely operate at different levels and latencies, and through different neuroanatomical routes.      
 
4.1 Automatic affective tagging of actions 
The results compiled in this review bolster the assumption that emotional and social 
influences on action monitoring may arise as a consequence of integrative processing of affect 
and action outcomes in dMFC and AI (see also Pessoa, 2008; Shackman et al., 2011), as outlined 
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in Figure 3. It has been demonstrated that error and conflict detection are accompanied by phasic 
responses in the limbic structures such as the amygdala (Kashtelyan et al., 2012; Pourtois et al., 
2010). Hypothetically, this structure responds to the specific affective or motivational value of 
action outcomes (Aarts et al., 2012). According to this framework, each simple action is not only 
deemed correct (goal conducive) or incorrect (goal obstructive) by means of phasic dACC 
activity rapidly following its onset, but also likely tagged ‘automatically’ as good or bad rapidly 
following the onset of the action. This ‘affective tagging’ might explain the enhanced synchrony 
(in the theta band, selectively) seen between dACC and amygdala during action monitoring and 
error detection (Pourtois et al., 2010). Given the role of the amygdala in vigilance (Davis and 
Whalen, 2001) and in the detection of relevant events (Sander et al., 2003), one possibility 
accounting for these neurophysiological effects during action monitoring is that this mesio-
temporal lobe structure directly receives information from the dACC to process the motivational 
significance of actions, and eventually mediates the differential autonomic arousal to response 
errors, as opposed to correct responses (Hajcak et al., 2003b; Proudfit et al., 2013). Ultimately, 
this evaluative process could foster adaptive behavior by helping the organism to quickly 
identify salient or threatening actions that are associated to positive vs. negative affective states. 
Presumably, these affective processes during action monitoring are captured by systematic 
amplitude variations at the level of the ERN (Aarts et al., 2013; Compton et al., 2013; Luu et al., 
2000; Moser et al., 2013; Proudfit et al., 2013).  
 
4.2 Perception of social agency during action monitoring  
Our review further suggests that observed errors and action outcomes evoke similar 
electrophysiological components and partially overlapping brain activation than self-generated 
 29 
errors and actions (de Bruijn et al., 2009; Koban et al., 2013a; Koban et al., 2012b; Miltner et al., 
2004; Shane et al., 2008; van Schie et al., 2004), although they might be based on separate 
neuron populations (Yoshida et al., 2012). Monitoring others’ actions may enable us to interact 
efficiently during joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006a; Vesper et al., 2010) and to learn by 
observation (Bellebaum et al., 2010; van Schie et al., 2004). Yet, an unresolved question 
concerns the processes that allow the attribution of error agency. An integrative framework of 
action monitoring has to incorporate a mechanism that indicates whether it is the ‘self’ or another 
agent that is responsible for a specific action outcome (Brass et al., 2009; Gallagher, 2000; 
Georgieff and Jeannerod, 1998). 
A plausible solution is that the brain compares action predictions (i.e. a motor reference 
copy) with the actual sensorimotor consequences of these actions (Blakemore et al., 1998; 
Chambon et al., 2012; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Sato and Yasuda, 2005). Discrepancy between 
predicted and actual motor behavior is associated with activation of the angular gyrus in the 
parietal lobe (Chambon et al., 2012; Farrer et al., 2008; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Miele et al., 
2011), which could thereby reversely encode the amount of perceived self-agency (Chambon et 
al., 2012). This is consistent with a role of this inferior parietal region in the attribution of motor 
control to other agents (Ruby and Decety, 2001).  
Conversely, when investigating positive brain correlates of self- versus other-agency, 
Farrer & Frith (2002) reported activation in the left AI in addition to motor control-related 
regions such as supplementary motor area, sensorimotor cortex, and cerebellum (see also David 
et al., 2006). Similarly, Brass & Haggard (2010) recently proposed that the AI has a crucial role 
in intentional self-generated action and suggested that this region could evaluate self-generated 
actions regarding their affective value, thereby guiding learning and future action selection.  
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We propose that the monitoring of action and error agency is not only crucial for 
learning, but it also critically determines emotional states associated with different action 
outcomes (cf. Koban et al., 2013a). In addition to action correctness and social relationship, the 
perception of agency may determine whether we feel guilty or angry following errors, and 
whether we experience pride or envy after positive action outcomes. Thus, the AI is well placed 
to integrate information about action outcomes not only with affective and social context factors, 
but also with the perception of self-agency (Brass and Haggard, 2010; Koban et al., 2013a). 
Integration of outcomes with agency and social context information may lead to error awareness 
(Ullsperger et al., 2010) and to the generation of more complex specific feeling states that are 
associated with different action outcomes (Craig, 2009; Koban et al., 2013a; Koban et al., 
2012b). 
 
4.3 Different levels of integration within the dMFC vs. AI 
 Although speculative at this stage, the different findings reviewed here above regarding 
interactions between action monitoring, affective processes, and social factors support the view 
that the dMFC and AI each contributes to bring together different and complementary sources of 
information during the monitoring of actions (see Figure 3). In this view, positive vs. negative 
affective value of actions are determined quickly and automatically by the dACC/dMFC in 
conjunction with specific striatal and limbic structures (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Holroyd and Coles, 
2002a). This is in line with theoretical accounts, which have suggested that the dACC/dMFC 
primarily operates as a monitor of conflicts, errors, and more generally, differences between 
actual and predicted or desired states, which require adjustments in cognitive control (Alexander 
and Brown, 2011; Botvinick et al., 2001; Holroyd and Coles, 2002a; Shackman et al., 2011; 
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Shenhav et al., 2013). Action monitoring in dACC/dMFC is sensitive to motivational factors 
such as perceived costs and reinforcement values (Shackman et al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 2013) 
and consequently an intrinsically affective evaluation (Aarts et al., 2012; Aarts et al., 2013; 
Proudfit et al., 2013), which may be enhanced in anxiety and other affective disorders (Aarts and 
Pourtois, 2010; Moser et al., 2013; Proudfit et al., 2013).  
By comparison, we propose that the AI uses this information in a second and parallel 
stage of action monitoring and integrates information about action correctness from the 
dMFC/dACC with action agency, and into a broader context of emotional and social factors 
(Frith et al., 2008; Koban et al., 2013a; Seth et al., 2011). This second integrative step may 
generate the Pe and feedback-P300 components and be associated with error awareness (see 
Craig, 2009; Dhar et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Ullsperger et al., 2010). Given the 
important role of AI in emotions and in representing others’ feeling states (Engen and Singer, 
2013; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012; Singer et al., 2009), activity of this region during 
action monitoring may reflect the generation of complex and situation-specific emotions (e.g. 
feelings of guilt when one’s errors cause pain to close others, Koban et al., 2013a). 
Recent findings on error monitoring in individuals with psychopathy and unemotional-
callous traits support this idea. Psychopathic personality is characterized by ongoing antisocial 
behavior, lack or empathy or remorse, and difficulties in inhibition and behavioral control, which 
are paralleled by widespread abnormalities in prefrontal cortex (Anderson and Kiehl, 2012; 
Koenigs, 2012). Recent studies demonstrated that in psychopathy, the AI is altered both 
structurally (Aoki et al., 2013) as well as functionally in response to others’ pain (Decety et al., 
2013). In parallel, ERP results showed that psychopathy reduces the size of the Pe component 
selectively, while leaving the ERN and post-error adjustment in behavior intact (Brazil et al., 
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2009). This indicates that psychopathy may be associated with a specific alteration of the 
integration processes with affective, social, and agency factors during action monitoring, for 
which the AI likely plays a predominant role (Brass and Haggard, 2010; Koban et al., 2013a; 
Ullsperger et al., 2010).  
Although preliminary and awaiting future empirical validation, our framework may help 
to delineate the respective functions of two major anatomical components of action monitoring. 
Both dMFC/dACC and AI may contribute to trigger changes in adaptive control through 
modulation of interconnected fronto-parietal areas (Chang et al., 2013) at different latencies 
following action onset. Speculatively, we propose that the dACC might be more important for 
automatic action monitoring, whereas the AI could be crucial for generating emotionally more 
complex states, which could serve as a basis for more deliberate and conscious efforts to adjust 
behavior in a more flexible way (Figure 3). Additional imaging and neurophysiological studies 
are needed to test this hypothesis and to confirm the complementary and dissociable functions of 
AI and dMFC/dACC during action monitoring.  
-- please insert Figure 3 about here -- 
 
4.4 Outstanding questions and future directions 
Although this review gives an overview of the potential roles of different brain regions 
involved in social-affective effects on action monitoring, several important questions remain 
unanswered at this stage. First, term-based meta-analysis provides information about common 
activations across a large number of studies (and by extension hundreds of individual subjects), 
but it is not clear, whether overlapping activations for error monitoring and social-affective 
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processing would also be found at the individual level. More importantly, conjunction of activity 
does not equal functional convergence or involvement of the same neural populations, and more 
intracranial electrophysiological studies in patients and animals are needed to investigate the 
functional relationship of different processes in AI and dMFC.  
As a second limitation of the automated meta-analytic approach, it is not clear whether 
dMFC and AI/IFG activations reported in imaging studies on social cognition or emotion reflect 
specifically social or affective processes. More basic mechanisms or qualities such as effort or 
arousal could be common to emotion, social cognition, and action monitoring tasks (Kool et al., 
2010; McGuire and Botvinick, 2010). DMFC and AI/IFG are among the most frequently 
activated brain areas across a large number of experimental paradigms and research questions 
(cf. Behrens et al., 2013; Craig, 2009; Shackman et al., 2011). It appears therefore unlikely that 
they would be specific for emotions, social cognition, and/or error processing. Yet, this fact does 
not contradict the hypothesis that these areas could be critical (even if not necessarily selective) 
for interactions between error/conflict monitoring and affective or social factors. Given the 
costliness of neural computations, it is doubtful that brain areas just get activated as “by-
products”. On the contrary, frequently activated areas such as AI and dMFC often constitute 
important hubs within and between different functional networks, and could thereby link 
different processing domains or have functionally integrative properties (Achard et al., 2006; 
Buckner et al., 2009; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). Again, lesion studies in patients and 
additional mechanistic work in nonhuman primates might help to illuminate the roles of AI and 
dMFC in the interplay between social-affective and action outcome processing. 
Third, little is known about the developmental trajectories of the contributions of AI and 
dMFC/dACC to action monitoring, especially their specialization during infancy and 
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adolescence (Modha and Singh, 2010). Gaining additional information about the development 
and maturation of these two regions will yield a better understanding of their roles and functions 
during action monitoring at the adult age. Further, specific developmental trajectories could also 
inform us about the origin of abnormal or pathological conditions (e.g. psychopathy) that may 
arise partially because of functional or structural alterations in this network (Anderson and Kiehl, 
2012; Bernhardt et al., 2013; Brazil et al., 2009; Brazil et al., 2011). In this respect, recent 
advancements in developmental cognitive neuroscience and neuroimaging promise to lead to 
significant breakthroughs in our understanding of the complex interplay between affect, social 
cognition, and action monitoring (Crone and Richard Ridderinkhof, 2011). 
Fourth, given the extensive repertoire and malleability of socially-bound emotions in 
humans and their links to core action monitoring processes, it is important to develop new 
experimental methods that will enable studying the emergence of specific social emotions in the 
laboratory (Chang and Koban, 2013), as well as characterizing their neurobiological 
underpinnings (Barrett et al., 2007). New EEG or fMRI studies investigating action monitoring 
in social settings would allow exploration of changes in action monitoring brain processes in the 
medial frontal cortex and AI and dMFC, as well as the potential impairments in those processes 
in different psychopathologies, including social and generalized anxiety, autism, and 
psychopathy.         
Finally, because these two regions are likely influenced dynamically by several 
neurotransmitters systems during action monitoring (Cools, 2011; Cools et al., 2008; de Bruijn et 
al., 2004; Denk et al., 2005), neuroimaging studies combining pharmacological manipulations 
may provide a unique avenue for future research in order to delineate the nature and extent of 
interaction effects with social and emotional processes taking place in each of these two hubs. 
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Likewise, recent advancements in imaging genetics will provide important insights into how this 
complex performance monitoring brain machinery is shaped not only by situational factors 
related to the current affective state or social context, but also by genetic variations (Sallet and 
Rushworth, 2009).        
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Figure 1 – Event-related components generated at different stages of action 
monitoring for self-generated and observed actions. Conflict (e.g. interference with irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions or incongruent stimulus-response mapping) leads to the conflict-N2 peaking 
~300 ms following stimulus presentation. At the response level, errors are accompanied by a 
rapid negative deflection over fronto-central electrodes, the error-related negativity (ERN), that 
is paralleled by a much smaller correct-related negativity (CRN) for correct responses. Following 
the ERN, a large fronto-central positivity (the error positivity, Pe) can be measured around 100-
300ms following response onset. The ERN is generally thought to reflect a generic error or 
conflict detection mechanism, with sources typically located in the dACC (Debener et al., 2005; 
Dehaene et al., 1994; Doñamayor et al., 2011; Herrmann et al., 2004; Van Veen and Carter, 
2002). The functional characteristics of the Pe are still debated, but this positive deflection may 
relate to error awareness (Dhar et al., 2011; Endrass et al., 2005; Endrass et al., 2007; Klein et 
al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 2007; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; 
Ullsperger et al., 2010; Wessel et al., 2011), motivational aspects such as error salience 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2009), and post-error adjustments in behavioral control (Falkenstein et al., 
2000; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Overbeek et al., 2005a; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009; Vocat et al., 
2008). The Pe appears to be generated in either more rostral or rather posterior cingulate cortex 
regions (Herrmann et al., 2004; Van Veen and Carter, 2002; Vocat et al., 2008), alongside 
additional sources in insula and orbitofrontal cortex (Dhar et al., 2011). Similar response-locked 
components are evoked when observing another person’s errors (observer ERN and observer 
Pe), albeit with longer latencies (Carp et al., 2009; Koban et al., 2010; Miltner et al., 2004; van 
Schie et al., 2004). When external visual feedback is necessary to evaluate the outcome of an 
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action, the feedback-related negativity (FRN) can be measured around 250 ms following 
feedback presentation, The FRN has similar generators as the ERN in dACC/dMFC or, 
alternatively, in more anterior medial prefrontal cortex (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Gentsch 
et al., 2009; Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN is sometimes followed by a positive deflection, the 
feedback P300. Observing another person’s feedback leads to an observer FRN component 
(oFRN) that strongly resembles the FRN in latency and topography (Koban et al., 2012b; Yu and 
Zhou, 2006). 
 
Figure 2 – Neurosynth term-based meta-analytic activation maps. A) Significant 
activation for the terms ‘Error’ (red) and ‘Emotion’ (blue) with a significance threshold of p < 
0.05 (FDR corrected for multiple comparisons). Their conjunction (yellow) reveals common 
activation in anterior insula (AI), dorsal mediofrontal cortex (dMFC) and lateral prefrontal areas 
(LPFC), as well as basal ganglia. B) Significant activation (p < 0.05 FDR corrected) for ‘Error’ 
(red) and ‘Social’ (green), and their conjunction in AI, dMFC, and LPFC (yellow). Accordingly, 
these brain regions appear to be important for a dynamic integration of action monitoring 
processes with affective and social factors. 
 
Figure 3 – A framework for social and affective influences on action monitoring. 
Both dMFC/dACC and AI contribute to the monitoring of actions and to triggering adjustments 
in cognitive control that is implemented by lateral prefrontal areas and more generally the fronto-
parietal attention network. Yet, they have slightly different and complementary roles. 
DMFC/dACC might be responsible for the fast (e.g. pre-conscious) detection of errors, conflicts, 
and reward prediction errors (resulting in the ERN component), thereby monitoring actions along 
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a valence dimension using simple heuristics. This information could be used to thereby trigger 
automatic adjustments in cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, 2004; Shenhav 
et al., 2013). Functional connectivity with the amygdala and other limbic structures during error 
monitoring (Pourtois et al., 2010) may mediate autonomic responses to errors, and be associated 
with negative affective-motivational states that are automatically elicited by aversive action 
outcomes (Aarts et al., 2012). On the other hand, AI could be crucial for conscious aspects of 
error monitoring (Ullsperger et al., 2010), for integrating action outcomes with self-agency 
(Brass and Haggard, 2010; Farrer and Frith, 2002), and social context information (Koban et al., 
2013a), which may lead to the experience of more complex and situation-specific emotional 
feeling states (Brass and Haggard, 2010; Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004; Koban et al., 
2013a). These situation-specific feeling states (e.g. the experience of guilt when errors have 
negative consequences for others, regret when having chosen the wrong option, or anger when 
another person makes an important mistake) may underlie a more deliberate and flexible mode of 
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